Office for Foreign Relations and Information 

"We will send them to war and they have to win. This is the reason why they are here. But we will first take them their arms, to be on the safe side. Otherwise they could use them against us." You would not succeed in finding the author of this statement: it is a completely made-up quotation. If you think that you have heard or read something similar, it is not far from the truth. It is a leitmotiv of a debate about the relations between the political representation and intelligence services of any democratic state, i.e. debate that has recently been led almost exclusively in the context of the collocation "the fight against terrorism".

I apologize for the explosive mixture of exaggeration and media oversimplification. The media uses this well-tried method in order to speak the language that is comprehensible to everyone. The same weapon also belongs to an arsenal of a successful politician. However, this method is increasingly used even by the leaders of terrorist groups, who are becoming very skilful at it. Why am I talking about this? Simply because it is these people who determine the content and the form of the debate in question. It is not a surprise that they intend to target the same audience. It is a paradox that in the fight between the Good Ones (the media, politicians) and the Bad Ones (terrorists) there is often a common Enemy (secret services). We all feel that it is not that simple. However, we readily agree to follow the basic rule of the game: simplicity at any price.

However, in this case we pay too high a price for it. We have to realize that the debate forms tools which the democratic society is willing to use to prevent and counter any terrorist threat and to deal with the consequences of terrorist attacks. The key question is whether we perhaps do not force the debate into conclusions that "the public wants to hear". It is my personal opinion, but I am firmly convinced of it. A chaotic and simplified view of the phenomenon of a terrorism threat weakens our abilities to counter this threat.

Back to the made-up statement mentioned at the beginning: Intelligence services are here to win the war against terrorism. That is just a myth. The task of the services is not to "fight" and it is certainly not to fight in a "war". I am using the inverted commas to mark clearly the media terms I have chosen. The major task of the services is to provide those people who decide, i.e. the political representation, with information. It is the decision-makers who have to "lead the fight" and they have to do it with means that are most suitable for it. And the services are only one of these means, the means that is mainly aimed at preventing danger. However, the problem is that the media oversimplification indicates that it is the intelligence services which obtain information, make the decision, eliminate the enemy and which still manage not to exceed their - understandably limited and controlled - powers.

Speaking of powers and control, we should discuss them in more detail: Another favourite oversimplification is that intelligence services ask for as many powers as possible and that they try to avoid control like the plague. The reality is that the services really want to have more powers, as they need them for their work. On the other hand, they call for stronger control, for the two following reasons: firstly, it is necessary to prevent abuses of these powers; secondly, the services should have means to protect themselves against unsubstantiated allegations of acting ultra vires. One need only close their eyes to realize that they do not know who accuses the services of exceeding their legal powers: whether it is the media, politicians or those against whom the service are to "fight", i.e. terrorists.

Why is the issue of the fight against terrorism often narrowed down to the problem of good or poor performance of intelligence services in countering the many headed hydra of terrorism? It is simple, impressive, comprehensible and easy to understand. It may be a reaction to the directness of terrorists. They do not care about the basic moral principles or any laws; they use all means. This is their great advantage. Democratic states cannot and must not behave this way. However, they should not act as if it is the intelligence services which are "to do the dirty work", because that is not the case and because the states would thus disclaim their own liability.

In addition, democratic states should not act as if they have used all means, because that is not true, either. If the state is to be inspired by terrorists, it is their effective use of means they have that could be an inspiration to us. It is a high time we admitted that neither grand gestures, nor emotive decisions nor oversimplifications would help us in the campaign against terrorism. Soon it will be five years since the attacks of September 11, 2001. During that time we have gained enough experience that should warn us that there are no easy solutions. If there was some time for them, it has passed. What remains is shared responsibility, effective distribution of tasks and willingness to cooperate, within one state as well as within the whole international community.

I admit that it is not very optimistic. However, the purpose of this commentary was not to be optimistic. Perhaps, it is not concrete enough. However, that was not the purpose, either. My intention was only to outline some main topics that can be perceived as a big problem in the campaign against terrorism by intelligence services of any democratic state in the world. Mainly, I attempted to point out the risk of oversimplification. I deliberately used certain oversimplification myself. Do not condemn me for it: at least, I advised you of it right away.